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We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by
activist funds that compete for investor ow. Competition for ow a¤ects the
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nanced by (net) leverage,
which discourages value-creating interventions in economic downturns due to debt
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1 Introduction
Activist blockholders play a key role in mitigating the governance problem that a¤ects
publicly traded corporations with dispersed owners who have limited incentive to mon-
itor managers. The potential benets of blockholders has been widely recognized in
the theoretical literature on corporate governance since Grossman and Hart (1980) and
Shleifer and Vishny (1986). In recent decades, a specic type of blockholder activist
hedge funds has taken centre stage in activism (e.g., Gillan and Starks (2007)), gener-
ating gains to targets in terms of share prices and operating performance (Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), Cli¤ord (2008), Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009),
Klein and Zur (2009), and Boyson and Mooradian (2011)).
It is important to recognize that unlike the blockholders of classical corporate gov-
ernance models activist hedge funds are delegated portfolio managers: Their survival
relies on the approval of the investors who nance them. It is well known that investor
ows are positively related to fund performance, and that hedge funds are a¤ected
by such ow-performance relationships (Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008),
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), Baquero and Verbeek (2009)). Indeed, ows can
be four-times as important to hedge fund managers as incentive fees (Lim, Sensoy, and
Weisbach (2013)). Thus, hedge funds compete for investor ow.
In this paper we develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitor-
ing by activist hedge funds who compete for investor ow. Funds are principals as active
owners in target rms, who potentially enhance rm value by intervention. Simultane-
ously, funds are agents who manage the portfolios of investors and are thus exposed to
ow-performance relationships. We show that this exposure a¤ects the way in which
activist hedge funds full their governance role as blockholders. In particular, competi-
tion for ow induces them to inate short-term fund performance by increasing payouts
nanced by (net) leverage. This, in turn, discourages value-creating interventions in
economic downturns due to debt overhang. Thus, competition for ow is a critical in-
gredient that links together the observed procyclicality of activist block formation with
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the documented e¤ect of such funds on the leverage of their target companies.
The key elements of our model can be summarized as follows. Activist hedge funds
own blocks in target rms and aim to engage in a variety of potentially benecial gov-
ernance interventions. Some of these interventions are feasible in the short-term (e.g.,
releasing excess cash from target rms) while others take time and extended e¤ort to
implement (e.g., business improvements, restructuring, or merger of the target). The
potential returns to longer-term interventions are exposed to changes in economic condi-
tions (e.g., takeover premia may be sensitive to aggregate economic conditions). Hedge
funds di¤er in their intrinsic ability to generate returns from interventions: Good funds
are able to generate higher cash ows by intervening than bad ones. Funding for hedge
funds is provided by their fee-paying investors to whom the funds must provide periodic
returns. These investors make (rational) inferences about the ability of their funds based
on these returns, and then decide whether to take their money elsewhere.
Given the need to compete to keep investor capital, funds may be (rationally)
tempted to enhance their intrinsically generated returns by surreptitiously moving re-
sources forward in time, i.e., by raising nancing today against the targets future cash
ows. Investors, in turn, are fully capable of detecting and nullifying such enhancement
activity by incurring a verication cost, which can be arbitrarily small in our model. We
impose a (small) verication cost because the nancing of hedge fund targets is arguably
not fully transparent (in real time) to investors. However, for completeness, we also en-
tertain the possibility that external nancing is costlessly observable: In section 6, we
present a variation of the model with freely observable external nancing. In neither
version of our model is external nancing intrinsically a signalling device, contrary to
Ross (1977). Rather, funds signal via returns, and external nancing is simply a way to
enhance such returns in equilibrium.
We characterize hedge fund activism via a series of results. We rst show that, no
matter how small the verication cost, investors never verify the composition of hedge
fund payouts in equilibrium (Proposition 1). Intuitively, if investors were to verify,
then hedge funds would not enhance payouts, nullifying the investorsincentive to pay
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the verication cost. Yet, when the verication cost is small, pooling equilibria cannot
arise (Corollary 1): If bad funds were to successfully enhance their early returns in an
attempt to pool with the good, investors would prefer to verify and thereby nullifying the
mimicking attempt. Thus, in any feasible equilibrium good funds successfully separate
from bad funds, i.e., competition for ow is an essential part of equilibrium. Since
investors do not verify, such separation can only be achieved by a payout high enough
such that bad funds are incapable of mimicking. This, in turn, establishes a minimum
level of payout to hedge fund investors in any separating equilibrium (Proposition 2) and
implies that external nancing is essential for separation. We then show that debt is the
optimal way to raise external funds (Proposition 3) because it maximizes incentives to
exert e¤ort on subsequent long-term activist interventions. Finally, in our main result,
we characterize conditions under which even in separating equilibria with the minimal
amount of leverage borrowing is high enough to generate debt overhang in low macro
states leading to a shutdown in activist e¤ort (Proposition 4). Knowing this, hedge
fund investors will only fund activist blocks ex ante if macroeconomic prospects are
su¢ ciently good. If as is often claimed broad equity markets are a leading predictor
of macroeconomic prospects, then our results imply that activist block formation and
resulting SEC 13D lings would be a bull-market phenomenon.1
The conditions generating procyclicality identied in our main result are economi-
cally meaningful. Procyclicality with respect to macroeconomic states arises when ability
di¤erences between good and bad hedge funds are large enough. High ability di¤erences
induce investors to chase performance and it is the resulting competition for ow that
fosters leverage and thus debt overhang. Indeed, we show that competition for ow is not
only su¢ cient, but also necessary for procyclicality (Implication 2): Absent such compe-
tition, hedge funds enhance rm value in both states of the world, and thus investment in
1According to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, any entity acquiring a stake of
5% or more of the voting shares of a publicly traded company must le a Schedule 13D with the SEC
within ten days of the purchase. The schedule 13D provides information to the investing public about
blockholders in public companies and their intentions with regard to the company.
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activist hedge funds is attractive regardless of macroeconomic prospects. Indeed, in our
model both short-term and long-term interventions if undertaken are value creating
and, in this sense, activist hedge funds are intrinsically benecial. However, competition
for ow forces funds to lever up target rms, making value enhancement procyclical, and
investment in activist hedge funds desirable only when economics prospects are good.
From an applied perspective, two key themes emerge from our analysis. First, since
activist funds enhance payouts via increased net leverage, target rms experience in-
creases in payout and leverage. Second, as a result of the procyclicality discussed above,
investment in activist funds are higher in bull markets. Both implications resonate with
the available empirical evidence.
The empirical literature suggests that activist hedge funds increase target rm lever-
age or payout or both (e.g. Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), Klein and Zur
(2009)). We note that the evidence on leverage and payouts both relate directly to our
theory: In addition to the leverage mechanism of our baseline model, Section 5.4 shows
that debt overhang can emerge due to excessive payouts even without additional bor-
rowing. Further, there is evidence consistent with our results that the induced rise in
leverage increases the credit risk of target rms: Target companies disproportionately ex-
perience credit downgrades (Byrd, Hambly, and Watson (2007), Aslan and Maraachlian
(2009), and Klein and Zur (2011)). Prominent market participants have even suggested
that leveraged payouts in response to shareholder activism is detrimental. For instance,
BlackRocks chairman, Larry Fink, recently wrote to executives of BlackRocks port-
folio rms that Too many companies have... increased debt to boost dividends, and
that such actions can jeopardize a companys ability to generate sustainable long-term
returns.2
There is also growing evidence that activist block formation is higher in bull markets.
See, for example, Figures 1 and 2, which depict engagement disclosures (e.g., 13D lings)
by activist hedge funds over time in the US and elsewhere. These ndings are echoed in
2The Wall Street Journal, 21 March 2014.
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the nancial press. According to The Economist, In America investors began only two
new activist campaigns in the fourth quarter of 2008, down from 32 in the preceding nine
months and 61 in 2007.3 It is only after a strangely quietperiod during the two years
following this steep decline in activism, during which [m]any [activist investors] scaled
back or even closed shop,4 that activist campaigns started to re-emerge. Indeed, it is
only another eighteen months later, in mid-2012, when the market had regained most
of the value lost in the 2008 crisis, that according to Peter Harkins of D.F. King, a
proxy-advisor shareholder activism is getting back to normal after the nancial crisis
of 2008.5
Figure 1: Reproduced with Alon Bravs
permission. Based on an updated sample
and the same data collection procedure
and estimation methods as in Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy, and Thomas (2008).
Figure 2: Reproduced with Marco
Bechts permission. Based on Becht,
Franks, Grant, and Wagner (2014).
It is sometimes suggested in the nancial press that the procyclicality of returns
from activist hedge funds is caused by the relative lack of diversication of activist
portfolios.6 Further, since one of the commonly declared objectives of activist hedge
funds is the eventual merger of the target rm, it may also be tempting to attribute
the procyclicality of hedge fund activism to the procyclicality of M&A markets. While
3The Economist, Activist Investors: Flight of the Locusts, April 8, 2009.
4The Economist, Shareholder activism: Ready, set dough, December 2, 2010.
5The Economist, Corporate Governance in America: Heating Up,April 7, 2012.
6It is worth noting that an explanation based upon idiosyncratic shocks is hard to square with
patterns related to the business cycle.
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these other potential channels may have a bearing on the procyclicality of activism, it is
worth emphasizing that our analysis apart from delivering a self-contained model with
fully rational agents delivers an endogenous link between the observed procyclicality
of activism and the documented e¤ect of activism on the net debt of target rms.
In addition to these core results, our model generates several new and potentially
testable implications. We connect the leverage of hedge fund target rms with macro-
economic prospects. The better are these prospects, the higher is target fund leverage,
because when good times are more likely, target rms have higher debt capacity, result-
ing in a higher level of borrowing necessary to separate good from bad funds. We also
link macroeconomic prospects to the time-pattern of returns to target rm shareholders.
In particular, the better are these prospects, the more front-loaded are these returns.
This is because better prospects lead to greater leverage at the target level, moving
payouts to shareholders forward in time.
Finally, our framework claries the wealth e¤ects of hedge fund activism on existing
long-term creditors, thereby reconciling seemingly contradictory evidence: Klein and Zur
(2011) claim bondholders are expropriated, while Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas
(2008) nd that shareholder returns are higher if there is less preexisting debt. As
we show in section 5.3, when the target rm has long-term pre-existing debt, existing
creditors may be expropriated as a result of hedge fund activism while returns to equity
holders are reduced by the presence of pre-existing leverage. Since leverage created by
activist hedge funds is motivated by competition for investor ows, it may well end
up reducing the cash available to pay existing creditors when economic conditions sour.
However, target-level borrowing is carried out on rational credit markets and pre-existing
leverage reduces the (residual) debt capacity of the rm. The reduced debt capacity, in
turn, reduces the payout necessary for separation and lowers the cash ows received by
target shareholders.
While our model is motivated by activist hedge funds, the analysis and results may
apply more generally. It is often argued, for example, that the buyout activity of private
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equity funds is procyclical.7 Like hedge funds, private equity funds also receive more
capital if their performance on existing projects is high (Chung, Sensoy, Stern, and
Weisbach (2012)). In addition, the use of extensive leverage in private equity buyouts is
well known. Thus, at a qualitative level, our debt overhang story provides an explanation
for the cyclical features of private equity buyout activity as well. Indeed, consistent with
our results in section 5.1, Axelson, Jenkinson, Stromberg, and Weisbach (2013) nd
that private equity buyout leverage is procyclical. Two recent papers that theoretically
examine the procyclicality of private equity buyout activity are Martos-Vila, Rhodes-
Kropf, and Harford (2013) and Malenko and Malenko (forthcoming).
Our paper engages with a large literature, both theoretical and empirical. The em-
pirical literature has already been discussed above. At the broadest level, our paper
belongs to the rich theoretical tradition of modeling blockholder monitoring in publicly
traded corporations (e.g. Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Ad-
mati, Peiderer, and Zechner (1994), Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), Bolton and
von Thadden (1998), Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998), Tirole (2001), Noe (2002),
Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), Admati and Peiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), and
Edmans and Manso (2011)). This literature does not account directly for the delegated
nature of blockholding, a phenomenon particularly prominent in the US and the UK,
but also relevant elsewhere. A handful of recent papers have started to consider the role
of incentives in delegated portfolio management in a¤ecting the nature of blockholder
monitoring. Goldman and Strobl (2013) examine how a given degree of fund managers
short-termism a¤ects rm investment policy. Dasgupta and Piacentino (forthcoming)
model the e¤ect of competition for investor ows on the ability of blockholders to govern
via the threat of exit. While these papers share, in the broadest of terms, our interest in
modeling the e¤ect of incentive conicts arising from the delegation of portfolio manage-
ment on blockholder monitoring, none of them consider the issue of the procyclicality
7In their model of the optimal nancing structure of private equity funds, Axelson, Stromberg, and
Weisbach (2009) demonstrate how the procyclicality of funding implies overinvestment in booms and
underinvestment in busts.
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of hedge fund activism. Finally, our paper has a family connection to the literature on
how competition for investor ows a¤ect the prices, returns, volume, and volatility of
assets traded by money managers (e.g., Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011), Guerrieri
and Kondor (2012)).
2 Model
In our model activist funds (AF) are involved in two agency relationships, as principals
in one and as agents in the other. On the one hand, funds are active owners (principals)
in target rms (TF) with the intent to increase rm value through monitoring and
intervention, e.g. by increasing payouts, restructuring, or selling assets. On the other
hand, funds are delegated portfolio managers (agents) nanced by investors (IN) who
pay fees to them and evaluate their performance. In addition, there are nanciers (FI)
who may provide nancing to rms targeted by funds.
There are two periods (t = 1; 2), and many rms, funds, investors, and nanciers.
Each fund is nanced by an investor and enters the rst period having used the investors
capital to acquire a stake in a target rm. Each target rm can subsequently raise funds
from a competitive deep pocketed nancier. All actors are risk-neutral and there is no
discounting.8
Activism: Activist funds come in two types  2 fG;Bg, where Pr( = G) = .
Regardless of type funds can engage in two forms of activism, each of which increases
target rm cash ows. The rst form of activism can be implemented relatively quickly
and occurs in the rst period. The second form of activism takes time and e¤ort and
8As a result of the assumption of universal risk-neutrality, we ignore issues related to block size. In
particular, we write the payo¤s to funds and their investors as iffunds owned the entire target rm.
This is not true in practice, but in our model accounting for block size would amount to a simple
scaling of all payo¤s, leaving the qualitative results unchanged. Potential concerns about additional
information that could be impounded in secondary market prices by the trade of direct owners of the
target rms are mitigated by the fact (as shown below) that our equilibria are fully revealing.
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occurs in the second period. For concreteness, we consider specic manifestations of
these two types of activism, namely free-cash ow mitigation and restructuring as de-
scribed below. However, as we discuss in Section 3.5, the model can be more broadly
interpretated.
Short-term activism (t = 1): Suppose each target rm has excess cash of C > 0
in the rst period which, if left under the discretion of the rms manager, will be wasted
(e.g., invested in zero gross return projects or otherwise diverted). Funds can identify a
type-dependent amount of free cash x1: We assume that x
G
1 is distributed according to
a cumulative distribution function H on the domain [x1; C] and that xB1 = x
G
1  x1
where x1 > 0. Any identied excess cash is disbursed to shareholders at the end of
the rst period. In addition, funds can increase payouts as follows: By expending an
innitesimal e¤ort cost, they can raise some amount F 2 R+ from nanciers against the
second period cash ows of the rm. As a result the payout at the end of the rst period
is D1 = x1 + F .
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Long-term activism (t = 2): Suppose that activists can, in the second period, con-
tribute their skills to restructure, generate business improvements, or initiate a merger.
Further, the cash ows generated by such activism depend on the aggregate (macro) state
of the economy. There are two possible macro states, s 2 fH;Lg, with Pr(s = H) = s.
The state is publicly revealed at the beginning of the second period. Following the
revelation of the state, funds can exert e¤ort e 2 f0; eg at private cost
ce =
8<: 0 if e = 0ce > 0 otherwise ;
giving rise to cash ows, Xs with probability e and X

s with probability 1   e. These
cash ows, net of any payments to nanciers, are paid out to shareholders at the end
of the period (D2). We make standard monotonocity assumptions, i.e., Xs > X

s for all
9D1 does not literally have to be paid out to fund investors, but can instead be reinvested in other
targets on their behalf. Further, as discussed in Section 3.5, the model also allows for external nancing
at the level of the fund.
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; s (activist e¤ort increases cash ow), XGs > X
B
s for all s (good activists are better
than bad ones), and XH > X

L for all  (e¤ort generates higher cash ows in the high
macro state).10 Further, we assume that:
XGH  XGH > XGL  XGL : (1)
This implies that the marginal returns to activist e¤ort by a good fund is higher in booms
relative to busts, which is consistent with Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) who
nd that activism is most valuable during periods of high market valuation. This as-
sumption is necessary, but not su¢ cient for our results: We show in Section 4.2 that,
absent competition for ow, procyclicality would not arise, even given assumption (1).11
A leading interpretation: A tting interpretation of our model is in terms of
activist hedge funds and their targets. The mitigation of free cash ow problems is a
central goal of activist hedge funds. As Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) note in their survey,
hedge fund targets can be characterised as ...cash-cowswith low growth potentials
that may su¤er from the agency problem of free cash ow.12 Longer-term forms of
activism by hedge funds often include changes in business strategy and the merger of
target companies. Such changes, taken together, constitute 43% of 13D lings. Finally,
our model requires that a given hedge fund potentially engages in more than one form
of activism. There is also persuasive evidence for this. In the Brav, Jiang, and Kim
(2010) sample, 48% of 13D lings between 2001 and 2007 do not declare a specic intent
10These payo¤s imply a perfect correlation in ability (by type) across the two forms of activism. Our
qualitative results only require that this correlation is su¢ ciently high. For example, we could allow a
small probability  that bad funds get lucky and generate xG1 in the rst period.
11As will be clear in Section 3.3, assumption (1) is used in the derivation of the optimal nancing
contract. If we impose that target rms issue uncontingent debt (consistent with the endogenous
equilibrium outcome), procyclicality would also obtain if marginal returns to e¤ort were higher in the
low state, i.e., assumption (1) can be dispensed with.
12It is also reasonable to model payout policy changes as being a more speedily implementable form
of activism as Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) present evidence that changes in payout policy happen more
quickly than other changes (Table 5).
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(i.e., state general undervaluationas the reason for intervention). The remaining 13D
lings declare intent to (i) make changes to capital structure or (ii) business strategy,
(iii) engage in a sale of the target company, or (iv) improve governance. While specic
declarations of intent (13Ds that did not fall into the general undervaluationcategory)
constituted only 52% of the sample, the percentages of 13D lings that declared goals
(i)-(iv) above sum to nearly 85%. Thus, on average, hedge funds state around two
distinct activist goals per 13D declaration, consistent with our model, which we now
continue to describe.
External nancing: Following leading papers in the amplication literature (e.g.,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009)), rms in our model do not have access to state contingent nancing. The absence
of state contingent nancing stems from our assumption that project success or failure
(within a given macro state) is veriable, while the macro state itself is not. This specic
microfoundation is su¢ cient, but not necessary.13 All we need is that rm-level nancing
is not fully indexed to macroeconomic conditions. Alternative rationalization for such
lack of indexation can be found, e.g., in Krishnamurthy (2003) or Korinek (2009).
Information: Funds are the most informed party in the model. At the beginning of
the rst period funds learn their type  and the realized values of xB1 and x
G
1 .
14 Investors
only learn the realized values of xB1 and x
G
1 . At the end of the rst period, investors see
the payout D1 and form beliefs 
pre
IN (D1) = Pr ( = GjD1). They may then, at private
cost cv > 0, verify (avIN = 1) the amount of funding F (in which case they observe F
perfectly) or choose not to do so (avIN = 0) : Hedge funds have multiple methods for
13Our microfoundation is motivated by Shiller (1998), who writes (p. 2): These economic causes of
changes in standards of living that should be insurable without moral hazard because they are beyond
individual control are still not insurable today because they are not so objective or easy to verify as
res or disabilities.
14By assuming that funds do not initially know their type we e¤ectively rule out signalling via
compensation contracts. The lack of initial self-knowledge could be understood in a broader dynamic
context where new funds are born every period and incumbent funds do not know their skills relative
to these newcomers.
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raising external nance at the level of the target rm such as bank borrowing, drawing
down credit lines, lengthening trade credit terms, etc.15 It therefore seems plausible
that investors do not costlessly observe the precise composition of the payout in real
time. (Nevertheless, in section 6, we consider the case in which cv = 0.) Following
verication, the investors beliefs are denoted by postIN (a
v
IN) where 
post
IN (0) = 
pre
IN (D1)
and postIN (1) 2 f0; 1g since verication reveals the funds type perfectly. They then
decide whether to retain (arIN = 1) or to re (a
r
IN = 0) the fund. If a
r
IN = 0, the fund is
shut down, and the target rm is sold to outside buyers (at fair prices) and continues to
operate generating cash ows Xs. Non-veriability of macro states implies that of these
cash ows, only XL is available to be divided amongst nanciers and the new equity
holders according to the seniority specied in the contracts. Financiers do not observe
the realized values of xG1 ; x
B
1 , but observe F (since they are providing it). They form
beliefs FI (F ) = Pr ( = GjF ) and set the repayment terms R
 
Xs

and R
 
Xs

due at
the end of the second period to break even, making all relevant equilibrium inferences.
Fund fees: Motivated by observed compensation arrangements in the hedge fund
industry, fees in our model are made up of two parts. The rst part is an assets-under-
management fee, w; paid during each period of employment, at the beginning of the
period. The second part is an incentive fee a so-called carry which is max(D2; 0)
for some  2 (0; 1). This implies that funds that are retained by their investors for the
second period get a share of the liquidating cash ows to equity holders.
Abstracting from the rst period carry is a simplication which as will be clear
later reduces incentives for raising external nance. Since our paper emphasizes the
negative implications of excessive external nancing induced by competition for investor
ow, this simplication works against us. We also abstract from lock-up provisions. All
that we require is that there is an additional payo¤ to a fund from being viewed as good
as opposed to bad. Instead of outows for being bad, we could instead have lock-up
provisions and additional inows to those funds that are identied to be good possibly
15Li and Xu (2010) document that a signicant fraction of hedge fund target borrowing is bank based.
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put into a second fund run by the same manager.
Finally, to focus on the interesting constellation of parameters, we restrict attention
to:
e
 
XBH  XBH

< ce  e
 
XGL  XGL

: (2)
The inequality on the left guarantees that investors would not wish to retain a bad fund
if identied. If investors were to retain both good and bad funds, there is no competition
for ow, eliminating the sole source of agency problems at the fund level in our model.
The inequality on the right excludes the possibility that the good hedge fund does not
exert e¤ort in the low state purely due to the high cost of activism. Violating this
inequality is tantamount to hard-wiring a connection between economic downturns and
reduced activism.
Before solving the model, we underscore a key feature of our framework. Given
the non-veriable component of returns in the high state, the bad fund always has
an incentive to try to mimic the good fund and to survive into the second period.
Irrespective of the second period assets under management fee and carry, survival enables
the bad fund to e¤ortlessly earn at least an expected payo¤ of s
 
XBH  XBL

> 0. Note
that this minimal payo¤ is independent of the assumed compensation contract. Thus,
the key mimicking incentive that underlies all our results below would arise under any
short-term compensation contract.
3 Equilibrium
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by (F ; e(); avIN ; arIN ; R () ; pre

IN ; 
post
IN ; 

FI)
where (i) the verication decision av

IN is optimal given beliefs 
pre
IN , and the retention
decision ar

IN is optimal given beliefs 
post
IN ; (ii) The repayments R
 () allow the nancier
to break even given beliefs FI ; (iii) Funding F
 and state-contingent e¤ort e () are
best responses of the fund to (av

IN ; a
r
IN ; 
pre
IN ; 
post
IN ) and (R
 () ; FI); and (iv) The
beliefs pre

IN ; 
post
IN ; 

FI are consistent with Bayes updating along the equilibrium path
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and are arbitrarily chosen otherwise. In this section, we characterize the perfect Bayesian
equilibria of our model.
3.1 No verication in equilibrium
We rst show that the investor will never choose to verify in equlibrium.
Proposition 1 Verication never arises in equilibrium as long as (i) cv is small, (ii)
XGL is large, and (iii) R () satises R0
 
Xs
  1 for all Xs and R0  Xs  < 1 for Xs
su¢ ciently large.
If the investor were to always verify, funds would not enhance their intrinsic cash
ows and dividends would reveal types. Such payments render (costly) verication by
the investor redundant. Thus, in equiibrium, the investors cannot verify with probability
one. The next possibility is that the investor may verify with probability strictly be-
tween 0 and 1. This can only arise if both types pay the same dividend and the investor
obtains the same expected payo¤s from verication and non-verication. However, if
both types of funds were to pay identical dividends, the investor strictly benets from
verication, which rules out random verication. To see this, compare the investors
continuation payo¤ from verication to that of any retention strategy without verica-
tion. On the one hand, for small cv, verication dominates retention without verication
because it saves the costs of retaining a bad fund. On the other hand, for large XGL ,
ring without verication is dominated by verication because a retained good fund
generates high overall cash ows and under condition (iii) above, which is satised
by standard debt contracts it is the investor who benets from this. Thus, when cv
is small and XGL is large, the investor strictly prefers to verify whenever he observes
a pooling dividend. Thus, the investor cannot follow a mixed strategy with regard to
verication. To conclude, since the investor can neither verify for sure, nor mix, the
only remaining possibility is that he never veries in equilibrium. These arguments also
imply the following result:
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Corollary 1 There exists no pooling equilibrium.
As established above, if both types of funds were to pay identical dividends, the
investor would strictly benet from verication and learn the type. Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1 jointly imply that the only remaining possibilities are separating equilibria
without verication. For brevity, we shall henceforth refer to these as separating equi-
libria. In what follows, we do not allow for the unrealistic possibility that all nanciers
commit to provide arbitrary but identical amounts of funding to each and every target
rm. Therefore, we only consider equilibria without such commitment.16
3.2 The need for external nance for separation
We begin the analysis by making a few straightforward observations about separating
equilibria. The corresponding results are formally stated and proved in the appendix.
Since investors never knowingly retain bad funds such funds are always closed down
at the end of the rst period in any separating equilibrium. This means that in any
separating equilibrium, the bad fund will not raise external nancing (Lemma 3). Since
he will be discovered and closed down, it is not worth paying even the ininitesimal cost
of raising external nancing in the rst period. Now, since the bad fund does not raise
any funds F in a separating equilibrium, the nancier will rationally assume that any
positive amount F is raised by a good type (Lemma 4) and therefore is willing to invest
up to the (equilibrium) pledgable income of the good type (PIG).
We show that these observations sharply restrict the set of separating equilbria that
can arise. Since the nancier does not know xB1 and x
G
1 he cannot infer how much the
good type would need to raise in equilibrium. Thus, the nancier cannot detect potential
deviations by the bad type which involve raising any amount up to the pledgable income
of the good type. But this means that, to separate, the good type hedge fund must pay
16Equilibria with commitment can formally be ruled out, for example, by imposing the requirement
that nanciersbeliefs are always FI( bF ) = 1 for all bF 6= F . Such beliefs are compatible with the
equilibria we derive below.
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out an amount so high that, even by receiving the same nancing terms as a good type,
the bad type cannot imitate.
Proposition 2 In separating equilibria, D1(G) > x
B
1 + PI
G.
Except in the uninteresting case in which future cash ows that can be generated by
the activist hedge fund are so low that xB1 +PI
G  xG1 , i.e., that PIG < x1, separation
requires the use of external nance. Thus, the good fund must raise external nance
F (G) = D1(G) xG1  PIG x1:We therefore proceed to characterizing the optimal
form of external nancing, i.e., the contract that maximizes the incentives of the good
fund to exert e¤ort in the second period.
3.3 Optimal nancing contract
We now solve for the optimal nancing contract R () taking into account the fact that
only the good type seeks external nancing (by Lemma 3 above).
Proposition 3 Debt is the optimal contract for raising external funding F:
Since project success/failure is veriable but the macro state is not, promised re-
payments can take on at most two possible values, say R and R: Since, conditional on
separation (which eliminates the bad fund in the rst period) the future cash ows are
increasing in the good hedge funds e¤ort, we look for R and R which maximize the good
funds incentives to exert e¤ort. While e¤ort is costly for the fund, it allows it to obtain
an  share of a larger cash ow with probability e. In addition, the fund can appropri-
ate additional cash ows in state s = H as a result of the non-veriability of the macro
state: If the project succeeds, then the additional appropriation amount is XGH   XGL
whereas if the project fails the amount is XGH  XGL < XGH   XGL (the inequality follows
from assumption 1).17 Since e¤ort increases the probability of success from 0 to e, in the
17The assumption that the hedge fund (rather than the target rms management) can appropriate
non-veriable cash ows XGH   XGL and XGH  XGL amounts to stipulating that the hedge fund is able
to directly observe all rm cash ows.
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high state e¤ort also generates an additional payo¤ of e
  
XGH   XGL
   XGH  XGL
to the fund. Thus, as the proof in the appendix shows, the incentive compatibility
constraints of the good fund are:
e
  
XGL  XGL
    R R  ce in state s = L, and
e
  
XGL  XGL
    R R+ e    XGH  XGH    XGL  XGL  ce in state s = H.
For arbitrarily chosen parameters, these two constraints are clearly most slack if R R
is minimized, an observation related to the key insight of Jensen and Meckling (1976).
Imposing monotonicity, as is standard in this literature following Innes (1990), leads to
two possible optimal nancing arrangements: If the hedge fund raises less than XGL , we
have safe debt with repayment R = R < XGL . Otherwise, optimal external nancing is
achieved via defaultable debt with R > R = XGL .
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3.4 The consequences of borrowing to separate
We have shown to date that competition for investor ow implies that good hedge funds
always separate in equilibrium, and that such separation implies raising external nance,
which is best achieved by borrowing. In this section, we explore the consequences of
borrowing to separate. The subsequent analysis needs to be split, for technical reasons,
into two cases:
Case A:
 
XGH  XGH
  (1 + )   XGL  XGL (3)
and
Case B:
 
XGL  XGL

<
 
XGH  XGH

< (1 + )
 
XGL  XGL

: (4)
Since  is typically on the order of 0:2 for hedge funds, Case B is restrictive. Accordingly,
we focus on Case A in the body of the paper and relegate Case B to the appendix, where
18Needless to say, in the absence of any contracting frictions state contingent debt is the optimal
contract. Such nancial contracts are, however, at odds with the prevalence of straight debt in the real
world.
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we show that the economic content of our results is essentially identical across the cases.
Before stating our formal result, it is useful to introduce some suggestive terminology.
To motivate this terminology, note that since the hedge fund receives only the second-
period carry, he does not wish to borrow too much: The more he borrows, the less is
this carry (by denition). So, it is reasonable to focus on the separating equilibrium
that delivers separation with as little leverage as possible. In addition, since as will
be clear from our result below borrowing to separate may (under certain conditions)
shut down hedge fund activism in low macro states, focussing on separating equilibria
with minimal leverage establishes the conditions under which such reduced activism is
an essential element of equilibrium. In the remainder of the paper, we shall refer to the
equilibrium which delivers separation with as little leverage as possible as the separating
equilibrium with minimal leverage (SEML). It follows from Proposition 2, that in a
SEML the good fund borrows F (G) = PIG  x1.
Proposition 4 As long as XGL > X
G
L +
x1
s(1 s)e and x1 >
w
1  , the separating equi-
librium with minimal leverage involves:
i. For ce 2
 
0; (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

, e (s) = e for all s.
ii. For ce 2

(1  s)e

XGL  XGL

; e

XGL  XGL

, e (H) = e and e (L) = 0:
When e¤ort costs are relatively low, the fund exerts e¤ort in both macro states, but
when e¤ort costs are relatively high it does so only in the high state. This reduction of
activist e¤ort is, however, not down to high e¤ort cost alone: Given condition (2), if the
fund were the sole residual claimant to the incremental expected cash ows generated
by e¤ort in the low state, he would have exerted e¤ort in that state. He does not do
so because, in equilibrium, he cannot claim a su¢ cient fraction of the incremental cash
ow due to leverage taken on to separate from the bad type. Thus, leverage induced
by competition amongst funds generates debt overhang in the low state and shuts down
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activist e¤ort.19 Since this arises in the separating equilibrium with minimal leverage,
for the relevant range of e¤ort cost, such a state-contingent reduction of activist e¤ort
is an essential part of equilibrium.
The proof of this result involves four steps which are detailed in the appendix and
heuristically summarized here. First, we compute the minimum face value K which trig-
gers debt overhang in state s = L. This is determined using the incentive compatibility
condition in the low state and is equal to XGL   cee :
Next, we compute the maximum face value K which ensures e¤ort exertion in state
s = H. There are two natural bounds on K. First, conditional on paying K the hedge
fund must retain enough expected payo¤s to have incentives to exert e¤ort. At the same
time, K cannot be larger than XGL , because since macro states are non-veriable the
fund can always claim that total cash ow is XGL in case of success. It turns out that in
Case A (i.e., if condition 3 holds), the relevant upper bound on K is always XGL :
Thus, a debt contract which promises XGL   cee induces the fund to make an e¤ort
in both states. A debt contract that promises XGL induces the fund to make an e¤ort in
the high state only. The pledgeable income associated with each of these contracts de-
termines which one will be relevant in equilibrium. In the SEML the good fund pays out
just enough to separate even if the bad fund were to borrow the full pledgeable income
of the good. Hence, the good fund must use the contract with the higher pledgeable in-
come. Otherwise, the bad type could mimic the good types SEML payout, contradicting
separation.
The choice between the contract that promises XGL   cee and one that promises
XGL involves the following trade-o¤. On the one hand, the former contract pays less
conditional on success than the latter and the di¤erence is increasing in the e¤ort cost.
On the other hand, creditors are paid in full more often under the former contract (with
probability e) than under the latter (with probability se). Therefore, the pledgeable
19The reduction of activist e¤ort due to debt overhang would arise even if e¤ort choices were con-
tinuous. With continous e¤ort choices, optimal e¤ort may be higher in the high state even without
leverage. Nonetheless, leverage would endogenously amplify the wedge between the e¤ort choices.
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income associated with the former contract will be higher precisely when the e¤ort cost
is low. In that case, separation involves the use of a lower face-value contract which
maintains incentives to exert e¤ort in both states. In contrast, when e¤ort costs are
relatively high, separation involves the use of a higher face-value contract which destroys
incentives to exert e¤ort in the low state. This is the dichotomy captured in the result
above.
The conditions XGL > X
G
L +
x1
s(1 s)e and x1 >
w
1  can be understood as follows.
Consider the rst condition. In the SEML, the amount the good fund borrows to separate
is decreasing in x1 (F  = PIG x1). As a result, debt overhang can arise in the low
state only if the cost of e¤ort ce is su¢ ciently large given x1. Of course, a prerequisite
for debt overhang is that ce must be high relative to returns to e¤ort in the low state
XGL   XGL . Combining these requirements, a su¢ cient condition for debt overhang in
the low state for all feasible ce is that XGL   XGL is large relative to x1, which is
encapsulated in the rst condition. At the same time, x1 cannot be too small, because
otherwise investors would not wish to retain good funds: In the SEML, all but x1 of
the pledgeable income must be paid out in the rst period, hence retaining the good
fund is only attractive if investors second-period after-fee payo¤, (1  )x1   w, is
positive, which is encapsulated in the second condition.
It is worth pointing out, that introducing frictions in credit markets would relax
both of these conditions. If less than the total expected second period cash ows can
be pledged to creditors in the rst period, then second period expected payouts to fund
investors must be higher. Hence, retaining good funds is worthwhile even if x1 is small.
This, in turn, also relaxes the lower bound on XGL  XGL .
The two parameter conditions of Proposition 4, can also be interpreted in terms of
skills of activists funds. The parameter x1 measures the di¤erence in skills between the
good and bad hedge fund in payout activism. In turn, XGL reects the veriable returns
to successful activism by the good fund in the second period. Since XBL < X
B
H , and X
B
H is
bounded above by condition (2), a high XGL translates into a large di¤erence X
G
L   XBL .
But this, in turn, is a measure of the di¤erence in restructuring ability across good
21
and bad funds. Taking these two observations together, competition for ow generates
a tournament amongst hedge funds that induces su¢ cient leverage to prevent activist
e¤ort in low states precisely when ability di¤erences across funds are not small.
There are two interpretations of the cost variation captured in Proposition 4. First,
cost variations may be seen as representative of di¤erent activist styles. If, for example,
restructuring is more costly than the merger of the target, then one may expect to see
hedge funds aiming for restructuring to be more prone to reduce e¤ort in downturns.
Second, and perhaps more intriguingly, one could view the cost variation as a time-series
phenomenon, related to target selection. The evidence discussed in the introduction
suggests that hedge fund activism occurs in waves. It has been observed that early in a
wave activist funds select target rms where it is realistic to achieve value improvements,
whereas late in a wave when easy targets are scarce they aim for targets where value
improvement may be more di¢ cult to attain.20 Viewed through the lens of our model,
this variation can be interpreted in terms of costs of activist e¤ort: Early in waves hedge
funds engage in targets where activism is less costly and robust i.e., immune, to an
economic downturns. Late in waves hedge funds engage in targets where activism is
more di¢ cult which makes activism itself more fragile and sensitive to macroeconomic
conditions.
We conclude this section with two observations about when activist e¤ort is more or
less likely to be sensitive to macroeconomic conditions:
Corollary 2 The e¤ect of macroeconomic prospects:
a. Better macroeconomic prospects (higher s) make hedge fund activism more prone to
procyclicality.
20In The Wall Street Journal (online) 13 August 2013, referring to Ackmans stake in J. C. Penney,
Justin Lahart writes, quoting Alon Brav: Activists did well in 2009, but by late 2010... the easiest
pickings may have been taken. To create value under those circumstances, says Mr. Brav, "you will have
to do something that is not so simple." One example: entering the cutthroat world of department-store
retail and pushing through a huge reconguration of the business.
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b. When macroeconomic prospects are good (s >
1
2
) hedge fund activism is more prone
to procyclicality when it creates more value ( XGL is larger).
Statement (a) follows from the fact that the interval
 
0; (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

is
decreasing in s while the interval

(1  s)e

XGL  XGL

; e

XGL  XGL

is increasing
in s. Thus better macroeconomic prospects increase the range over which there is
debt overhang. Statement (b) follows from the fact that, for s >
1
2
; increasing XGL
lengthens the interval

(1  s)e

XGL  XGL

; e

XGL  XGL

more than it lengthens
the interval
 
0; (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

. Thus, when macroeconomic prospects are good,
higher potential cash ows from activism increases the relative range of activities over
which such cash ows are not produced in economic downturns.
3.5 Broader Model Interpretations
We have so far deliberately adopted a relatively specic interpretation for our model
which we believe to be natural and supported by the data. However, our model can
be more broadly interpreted. In our model there are two periods and macroeconomic
variation arises only in the second one. Needless to say, one can interpret the state of
the economy in the second period as being relative to its state in the rst. We can
then view our current rst period analysis as being conditional on a realised rst-period
state. Given any such state in the rst period, the economy may improve or decline in
the second. This means that, in principle, returns from both rst- and second-period
activism could be made macro state dependent without altering our qualitiative results.
This paves the way for a broader intepretation of our two forms of activism. This is
because the remaining di¤erence across the two forms of activism namely, the e¤ort
required to undertake them can also be relaxed.
Our formal analysis assumes, purely for simplicity, that there is no e¤ort cost as-
sociated with the rst form of activism, which we have interpreted as free cash ow
mitigation. Nothing would change if free cash ow mitigation requires e¤ort and funds
learn their types in the rst period as e¤ort is exerted. It would still remain the case,
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that in equilibrium the good funds would lever up to an extent that bad funds are unable
to match the enhanced dividend. Since, therefore, both forms of activism can be costly
and generate state-dependent returns, neither the sequence nor the labels given to the
two forms of activism are critical for the core mechanism. The assumed sequence of free
cash ow mitigation and restructuring can be reversed. For example, restructuring via
potential spin-o¤s of non-core assets could occur in the rst period with capital structure
adjustments occuring later. Activism would still be procyclical, since leverage generated
in an attempt to boost restructuring returns in the rst period would interfere with
costly capital stucture adjustments in the second.
Indeed, it is not even necessary that the activist fund potentially intervenes in two
di¤erent ways in the same target rm, as in the model. Consider instead a setting in
which each fund has a portfolio of target rms, intervening (in one way or the other) only
once per rm, in di¤erent periods for di¤erent rms. Procyclicality would still emerge
in such a setting if leverage is undertaken at the fund level rather than at the target
rm level. Competition for ow would still tempt funds into enhancing early returns
to investors by levering up. Under qualitatively similar conditions, endogenously gener-
ated leverage would be su¢ cient to dissuade activists funds from exerting e¤ort in any
portfolio rm that subsquently required restructuring if aggregate economic conditions
decline. Note that since borrowing at the hedge fund level is also not fully transparent,
it is reasonable to assume that it is at least somewhat costly for investors to verify the
source of returns, as in the baseline model, giving rise to endogenous opacity as before.
4 Procyclicality
Proposition 4 identies a range of e¤ort costs over which hedge fund activism becomes
sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. In this section we show that a consequence
of such sensitivity is that investment in activist funds becomes more attractive when
macroeconomic prospects are better, and that this provides a basis for interpreting the
available evidence on the procyclicality of 13D lings. We also pin down the role of
24
competition for ow in delivering our results: It is both necessary and su¢ cient in
fostering procyclicality.
Since our focus is on procyclicality, we consider investment incentives in the case
where ce 2

(1  s)e

XGL  XGL

; e

XGL  XGL

. The analysis for ce  (1 s)e

XGL  XGL

is in the appendix. It is easy to see that, if there were ex ante uncertainty about the cost
parameter ce, then our characterization of investment incentives would hold qualitatively
for any ce.
4.1 Activist block formation and macroeconomic prospects
To characterize the attractiveness of investment in activist hedge funds, we begin by
analysing the investorsex ante participation decision. We normalize the block price in
period 0 to be 1. The precise block price depends on the nature of the trading game
between the hedge fund and the prior owners of the block, a topic beyond the scope
of this paper. Our qualitative results only require that the block price does not fully
reect all information about the future cash ows generated by activist funds. This
would arise naturally if, for example, the fund acquired the block from investors who
were forced to sell due to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Then the price would simply
reect the reservation value of the seller. Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2013) provide
evidence suggesting that activist hedge funds do indeed exploit liquidity sales by other
institutions in forming blocks.
Suppose that the investor has initial wealth 1+w, and can either invest it in a storage
asset (with zero net return), or give 1 to an activist hedge fund to form a block and pay
him a fee of w for the rst period. If the investor employs a hedge fund, then (since all
hedge funds of either type participate) with probability  he is matched with a good
fund. In the SEML, the good fund pays out xG1 + se X
G
L + (1  se)XGL  x1 in the
rst period, and then in the second period the investor always pays w but the hedge
fund exerts e¤ort only in the high state. Hence, conditional on being matched with a
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good fund (with probability ), the investor receives in expectation
(1  ) s  e   XGL  K+ (1  e)max  XGL  K; 0+ (1  s)max  XGL  K; 0 w:
Given that (as shown in the proof of Proposition 4)K = XGL   x1se > X
G
L , the investors
expected payo¤ in the second period in this case is (1  )x1   w. Instead, with
probability 1    he is matched with a bad fund. The bad fund pays out xB1 in the
rst period and is closed down, and the investor sells the rm for a price XBL . Thus, the
investors expected total cash ows are:


E
 
xG1

+ se X
G
L + (1  se)XGL  x1   w + (1  )x1

+(1  )

E
 
xB1

+XBL

(5)
This is to be compared with the net return on the outside option which is zero. Thus,
the investor participates if and only if the value of the expression in (5) exceeds the
initial investment cost 1 + w. It is clear that as long as the non-divertible return from
hedge fund activism ( XGL ) is high enough the participation constraint is satised, without
violating any of the equilibrium conditions.
Our analysis of the investorsparticipation decision reveals a salient property. Since
XGL > X
G
L , for any given
 
E
 
xG1

; E
 
xB1

;x1; X
G
L ; X
G
L ; ; e; w; 

the expected payo¤
to investors from investing in an activist fund (given by (5)) is increasing in s. Thus:
Implication 1 Activist block formation is more attractive to investors when macroeco-
nomic prospects are better.
4.2 The role of competition for ow
To understand how competition for ow is relevant for such macroeconomic sensitivity,
imagine an alternative where investors (counterfactually) do not chase ows, and instead
retain the hedge fund with some arbitrary exogenous probability  2 (0; 1). Now, funds
cannot inuence their retention probability by their rst period return, and thus do not
compete to inuence investors. In particular, since funds receive only a second-period
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carry, which is reduced by borrowing in the rst period, they choose not to leverage at
all. Instead, they pay out x1 and then (if retained exogenously into the second period)
the good fund exerts e¤ort in the second period while the bad fund does not regardless
of the macroeconomic state (assumption 2). Due to the non-veriability of macro states
the cash ows available to investors is XL in case of success and X

L in case of failure.
Thus, investorspayo¤s are:0@  E  xG1 +  (1  )  e XGL + (1  e)XGL+ (1  )XGL
+(1  )

E
 
xB1

+  (1  )XBL + (1  )XBL

1A  w; (6)
which is independent of s. We can thus pinpoint the critical role of competition for
ow in rendering macroeconomic prospects relevant for investment in activist funds:
Implication 2 Competition for ow is necessary and su¢ cient to ensure that the at-
tractiveness of investment in activist funds is increasing in macroeconomic prospects.
5 Additional Empirical Implications
In this section, we outline the additional empirical implications of our model. Some of
these are new testable implications (sections 5.1 and 5.2), while others reconcile existing
empirical evidence (section 5.3). As before we focus on the case where e¤ort costs are
high enough that activist e¤orts cease in the low state and comment in passing on the
low costs case.
5.1 Economic prospects, target leverage, and returns to target
shares
The amount of borrowing in the SEML is PIGK  x1 = se XGL + (1  se)XGL  x1,
while the face value of the debt is XGL   x1se . Both quantities are increasing in s. Thus,
when s is higher, hedge fund activists will impose greater leverage on their target rms
in equilibrium. The reason is that better economic prospects implies a higher debt
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capacity for the target, which in turn implies that more borrowing is necessary for good
type funds to separate.
Implication 3 When economic prospects are better, hedge funds target rms are more
highly leveraged.
While we are not aware of any systematic empirical investigation of this question,
there is anecdotal evidence that activist hedge funds changed their tactics when they
resurfaced after the nancial crisis. According to The Economist, Activists are toning
down their attempts to get companies to take on more debt. Many were burned before,
and are reluctant to put their hands back in the re.21 Interpreted through the lens of
our model, this may simply be a case of lower market condence about future prospects
for the economy in 2010 than in the heady days of optimism prior to the nancial crisis.
It is also worth mentioning that target debt has a higher face value in times of better
economic prospects. So, if investment were of variable scale, there would be more debt
overhang if economic conditions soured (i.e., more projects would be shut down).
Finally, economic prospects also have implications for the time pattern of expected
returns to target shareholders. The expected equilibrium payo¤ to target shareholders
is 
 
se X
G
L + (1  se)XGL  x1 + E
 
xG1

+(1  )
 
E
 
xB1

+XBL

in the rst pe-
riod and x1 in the second period. Better economic prospects enhance rst period
payo¤s without a¤ecting second period payo¤s, because they lead to higher leverage for
separation, moving payouts to target shareholders forward in time.
Implication 4 When economic prospects are better, the returns to target rmsshare-
holders from hedge fund activism are more front-loaded.
The evidence in Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) (see Table 4) suggests that in the 2001-
2006 period a time of signicant optimism about economic prospects the abnormal
returns to target shareholders accrued in the early months of activist campaigns. This is
21The Economist, Shareholder activism: Ready, set dough, December 2, 2010.
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consistent with Implication 4. In addition, Implication 4 may also suggest that activist
hedge funds would be particularly attractive to impatient investors during periods of
signicant optimism about future prospects.22
5.2 Payout vs Restructuring
Our model also relates the nature of ability di¤erences within activist hedge funds to
the leverage of their targets, providing another set of potentially testable implications.
Keeping x1 large enough to satisfy the SEML conditions, it is clear that lower x1
implies higher leverage se X
G
L + (1  se)XGL   x1. x1 is a measure of managerial
talent di¤erences in combating the free cash ow problem. Thus, the less managerial
talent matters in the short-run payout enhancement form of activism, the higher is
leverage and the higher is the potential for debt overhang.
Implication 5 When talent di¤erences across activists matter little for mitigating free
cash ow problems, target leverage is higher.
Excessive target leverage is what gives rise to procyclicality and thus shuts down
restructuring in economic downturns. In turn, as ability di¤erences in mitigating free
cash ow problems become less important, a higher utilization of the targets debt
capacity is required for separation. Thus, it is precisely when activist hedge funds are
principally di¤erentiated by restructuring ability that restructuring becomes less likely
in downturns.
Ability di¤erences in tackling free cash ow problems also a¤ect the time pattern of
expected returns to target shareholders.
Implication 6 When talent di¤erences across activists matter little for mitigating free
cash ow problems, the returns to target rmsshareholders from hedge fund activism is
more front loaded.
22For ce 2
 
0; (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

, the pledgable income and thus leverage is independent of s
since activist e¤ort is independent of macro states. Thus, the two implications considered here are moot
for that case.
29
Again, the e¤ect works through the amount of leverage. Lower talent di¤erences in
tackling free cash ow problems translate into higher leverage, which moves payo¤s to
target shareholders forward in time.23
5.3 Do activists expropriate bondholders?
There is general agreement in the literature on the fact that as in our model hedge
fund activism produces signicant positive returns to target shareholders. However,
the empirical literature is not unanimous on whether (some of) these gains derive from
the expropriation of existing bondholders. At one end of the spectrum, Klein and Zur
(2011) argue that hedge fund activism leads to an expropriation of existing bondholders,
a conclusion shared with caveats and qualications by Li and Xu (2010) and Sunder,
Sunder, and Wongsunwai (2010). However, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008)
argue that expropriation of existing bondholders is unlikely to be a source of signicant
shareholder value because they nd that returns to target shareholders are higher in
companies which are previously unlevered.
Our core mechanism does not turn on the interaction between existing bondholders
and shareholders: Since the representative target rm is unlevered in our model, our
baseline results are silent on the issue of bondholder expropriation. Nevertheless, our
framework can be used to interpret the seemingly conicting evidence in Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) and Klein and Zur (2011). Reconsider the baseline model
with the following modications. Assume that the representative rm has some liquid
assets of Y0 > 0 in the rst period. Unlike the pre-existing excess cash C, which
is subject to a free cash ow problem, these liquid assets Y0 cannot be diverted by
company management. Thus, absent hedge fund activists, this Y0 would be retained
until the second period and available to pay pre-existing creditor claims, if any. Hedge
fund activists may pay out part or all of these liquid assets in the rst period to enhance
23For ce 2
 
0; (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

the amount of borrowing is also decreasing in x1, so the two
implications stated in this subsection hold for this range of costs as well.
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early returns to their investors, in addition to leveraging the target as in the baseline
model. As before, investors will not directly verify the composition of the payout but
will infer it in equilibrium. We compare two capital structures for the target rm: Either
the target rm has no pre-existing debt (as in the baseline model) or it has pre-existing
debt maturing in the second period with a face value of K0 2 (x1; Y0). For simplicity,
assume that Xs = 0 for all ; s and that X
G
H  (1 + ) XGL (corresponding to baseline
Case A). We can now state:
Proposition 5 For ce 2

(1  s)e XGL ; e XGL

, as long as XGL and x1 are large
enough, pre-existing target leverage may reduce shareholder returns from activism even
when activism expropriates existing bondholders.
Using arguments that parallel those of Proposition 4, we show in the appendix that
when e¤ort costs and ability di¤erences between good and bad funds are su¢ ciently
high, competition for ow induces the good fund to pay out all available liquid assets
in the rst period and also to leverage the target su¢ ciently to generate debt overhang
in the low macro state. This implies that activist funds reduce the cash available for
existing creditors: In the absence of hedge funds, pre-existing debt is safe and creditors
are paid in both states. In the presence of hedge funds, the pre-existing debt becomes
risky and creditors are only paid with probability e in the high state, consistent with the
ndings of Klein and Zur (2011). However, comparing target rms with and without
pre-existing leverage in the presence of activist funds, Proposition 5 shows that returns
to shareholders are higher when the target rm is unlevered. This is because pre-existing
target debt reduces the (residual) debt capacity of the target, which in turn reduces the
payout necessary for separation and hence the equilibrium rst period payout to target
rm shareholders. The second period payout is una¤ected because as in the baseline
model activist funds borrow all but x1 of the targets debt capacity. Hence, in the
presence of activist funds, returns are lower to the target rm shareholders when there is
pre-existing leverage, consistent with the ndings of Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas
(2008). Thus, our model provides a simple, stylized, framework that helps to resolve
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some of the contradictory empirical evidence in Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008)
and Klein and Zur (2011).
5.4 Excessive payout
The enriched framework introduced in section 5.3 delivers a further benet: It enables
us to examine whether our results hold if we restrict hedge funds to changing payout
policy only, i.e., preclude them from issuing new target debt. If that is so, then our
results can be interpreted in terms of increases in net debt  i.e., debt minus cash 
extending our models links to the empirical literature.
We show that our results are indeed robust to payout policy changes only as long
as the target has both pre-existing debt and liquid assets: For target rms with pre-
existing debt, a reduction in liquid assets increases net debt. Competition for ow can
deliver su¢ ciently high net debt to foster debt overhang in the low macro state. We
consider the same variation of the model as in section 5.3 except that new borrowing is
prohibited. Activist hedge funds salvage excess cash of x1 and pay it out at the end of
the rst period. They may augment the payment by tapping into liquid assets Y0. In
the absence of a hedge fund activists, the liquid assets Y0 would be retained until the
second period and available to pay pre-existing creditor claims.
Proposition 6 High payout to compete for investor ow may induce debt overhang even
without new target rm borrowing.
The intuition is that as before good funds must pay a high enough dividend at
the end of the rst period to prevent mimicking by bad funds. Since either fund can tap
into the liquid assets, the good fund must pay out at least xB1 + Y0 to separate. But,
then, for target rms with a su¢ cient amount of pre-existing leverage, debt overhang
arises in the low state.
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6 Monetizing Assets
In the baseline model investors can observe target rm leverage at some small cost. For
completeness, in this section we analyze a model in which target leverage is immediately
and costlessly observable. In this variant of the model, as in the baseline, each hedge fund
pays out x1 in the rst period from free cash ow mitigation where x
G
1   xB1 = x1 > 0
is constant and common knowledge. However, each fund can enhance these cash ows in
two ways: First, the fund can (secretly) monetize (liquidate/divert) assets from the rm
of some amount k 2 0; k where k > x1. Such monetization is costly in terms of future
cash ow from restructuring in a way described below. Monetization is meant to capture
myopic strategies that boost current earnings at the expense of long-term protability,
such as cutting R&D expenditure. Activist hedge funds are, in fact, sometimes accused
of pursuing such strategies (see, e.g., Co¤ee and Palia (2014)). Second, each hedge
fund can leverage the target rm as before. However, now, we assume that the amount
borrowed is publicly observed and creditors learn the type before lending. Clearly,
learning the type requires due diligence which is costly. Since such costs would not
alter the qualitative results, for simplicity we neglect them. As in the baseline model,
enhancement activity now leverage and monetization requires an innitesimal cost.
Following the revelation of the macro state in the second period, hedge funds can
exert e¤ort e 2 f0; eg at private cost c0 = 0 and ce > 0 respectively, giving rise to
cash ows, Xs with probability e and X

s with probability 1  e. Further, we retain the
monotonicity assumptions from the baseline model. As in Section 5.3, we simplify the
analysis by assuming that failure payo¤s are zero (Xs = 0 for all ; s). This implies
that assumption (1) of the baseline model becomes redundant. As regards e¤ort, we
make the following assumptions. First ce  e XGL , which is a simplied version of our
earlier requirement that, absent leverage, the good fund always exerts e¤ort. Second, in
contrast to the baseline model, we now exclude e¤ort by the bad fund only in the low
state: ce > e XBL , thus allowing for the possibility (out of equilibrium) that the bad
fund exerts e¤ort in the high state. This is because when leverage is observable and
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creditors learn the types, the bad fund can attempt to imitate the good only if he has a
positive debt capacity. However, to allow for ow competition, we bound the bad funds
ability. We assume that:
XBL <
w
se (1  )
; (7)
which implies that the bad fund will be red if identied.
Finally, monetizing assets k 2 0; k during the rst period reduces the second period
cash ow Xs to
 
1  k


Xs where  > k. We rst provide a parallel to Proposition 2:
Proposition 7 In separating equilibria, D1 (G) > x
G
1 + PI
B (k = x1)
Since k > x1 the bad fund has a way of o¤setting the good funds advantage at free
cash ow mitigation, i.e., if the good fund chose to pay out only xG1 at t = 1 then the bad
fund could imitate, destroying separation. One option for the good fund is to enhance
payout by borrowing FG > 0. Of course, so can the bad fund as long as FB = FG. In
particular, if the good fund borrows FG to pay out xG1 + F
G then the bad fund can set
k = x1, borrow FB = FG, and pay out xB1 + x1 + F
B = xG1 + F
G. The only way
to prevent this is that the good fund borrows enough that the bad fund cannot imitate.
Such a level of borrowing exists only because credit markets learn the type of the fund
by doing due diligence. Thus, now the good fund can borrow F^G = PIB (k = x1) + 
for some  > 0 and pay out xG1 + F^
G. Clearly, the bad fund cannot imitate this because
raising FB > PIB (k = x1) is impossible. Recall that it is not possible for the bad fund
to borrow FB < FG and divert k > x1, since the raised amount is publicly observed
and this would immediately reveal the type. As before, we focus on separating equilibria
with minimal leverage.
Proposition 8 As long as XGH , X
G
L and X
B
H are high enough
24 the good fund does not
monetize.
i. For ce 2
 
e XBL ; e
 
XGL   s XBL
 
1  x1


there exist a SEML e (s) = e for all s.
24To be specic, the bounds on XGH , X
G
L and X
B
H are given as follows: X
G
H must satisfy (16) and
(18), XGL must satisfy (17), and X
B
H must satisfy (15).
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ii. For ce 2
 
e
 
XGL   s XBL
 
1  x1


; e XGL

, the SEML involves e (H) = e and
e (L) = 0:
In equilibrium, the good funds leverage the target but do not monetize, whereas bad
funds do not leverage or monetize. Thus, despite the fact that leverage and monetization
are both available enhancement options for the good fund, in equilibrium he chooses not
to monetize. The superiority of leverage over monetization as an enhancement method
arises because, when XGH and X
G
L are high, monetization is very costly for the fund.
While this result is qualitatively identical to Proposition 4 there are two caveats:
Unlike the baseline model, we require XBH to be high and impose a positive lower bound
on ce. These di¤erences are for tractability: In the observable debt model, the required
borrowing of the good fund is driven by the debt capacity of the bad fund. The debt
capacity of the bad fund, in turn, depends on whether he exerts e¤ort in both states or
only in the high state. For simplicity, we examine only the case where the bad type does
not exert e¤ort in the low state. This imposes a strictly positive lower bound on ce. For
comparability with the main analysis of the baseline model we analyze the case where
non-veriability rather than incentive compatibility imposes the binding constraint
on the pledgable income of the bad fund in the high state. This requires that XBH is high
enough.
It is worth noting that our assumptions that XGH and X
B
H are high enough are not
payo¤ relevant for hedge fund investors or target shareholders: Non-veriability implies
that the payo¤s to all parties other than the hedge fund manager are determined by
XL only. Thus, qualitatively, the condition that is directly payo¤ relevant for hedge
fund investors and target shareholders is that XGL is high enough, in particular (using
condition (17) from the proof) that
XGL  XBL

1  x1


+
w
se (1  )
;
i.e., XGL is high relative to X
B
L . That is, it is exactly when good funds are able to
produce su¢ ciently higher returns for investors that investors chase ow and the in-
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duced ow competition may result in hedge fund activist e¤orts becoming sensitive to
macroeconomic conditions.
The comparative statics of this variant of our model are also qualitatively identical to
that of the baseline model. As in Corollary 2, increasing s increases the range over which
hedge fund activism is procyclical. Thus, better macroeconomic prospects decreases the
range over which there is no debt overhang and increases the range over which there is.
Implications 3-6 in the baseline model follow from the fact that the leverage necessary
to separate is given by the di¤erence in the debt capacity of the rm under the good
activist (which is increasing in s) and x1. In this variant of the model, the leverage
necessary for separation is given by the debt capacity of the rm under the bad activist
conditional on the (o¤ equilibrium) monetization of x1, which is se X
B
L
 
1  x1


(see
the proof of Proposition 8). This expression is also increasing in s and decreasing in
x1. So, implications 3-6 carry over qualitatively to this model.25
7 Conclusions
We propose a simple benchmark model of hedge fund activism in the presence of com-
petition for ows. Our self-contained theory helps to explain the observed procyclicality
of hedge fund activism and reconciles it with the documented e¤ect of activist hedge
funds on the net leverage of their target rms. In addition, we generate some testable
implications and help to resolve some ostensibly contradictory empirical evidence on the
wealth e¤ects of hedge fund activism on di¤erent stakeholders in target rms. Our paper
highlights how agency frictions arising out of the delegation of portfolio management can
a¤ect the nature of blockholder monitoring and, more broadly, may help to enrich our
understanding of corporate governance issues.
25We have focussed only on separating equilibria, but there always exist regions of parameters (in
particular, those where  ! 0) that the investors participation constraint cannot be satised in a
pooling equilibrium, and hence such equilibria cannot exist.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The result follows immediately from the following two lem-
mas.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium in which the investor veries with probability 1.
Proof of Lemma: If the investor veries for sure, then the investor identies the type
of the fund for sure and thus there is no benet to external nancing while there is an
innitesimal cost. Thus F = 0 for all . But, if F = 0 for all  then it is a best response
for the investor not to verify, since cv > 0.
Lemma 2 As long as cv is small and XGL is large and R () satises R0
 
Xs
  1 for
all Xs and R
0  Xs  < 1 for Xs su¢ ciently large, there is no equilibrium in which the
investor veries with interior probability.
Proof of Lemma: For the investor to verify with interior probability, the only equilibria
to consider are those in which DG1 = D
B
1 := D
P
1 . Let the gross (of verication cost)
expected payo¤ to verication be v. Following verication, the investor will retain
the good fund and re the bad one. Thus, v = 
G (D1) + (1  )XBL , where
G (D1) denotes the investors expected second period payo¤ from retaining a good
fund given D1. Without verication the investor may always retain (with expected
payo¤ 1) or always re (with expected payo¤ 0). It is clear that 1 = 
G (D1) +
(1  )
 
XBL (1  )  w

while 0 = XBL . Randomization requires that v   cv =
max (1;0).
First compare v and 1. Since v > 1, for small enough cv, v   cv > 1. Next,
compare v and 0. Note that
v   0 = G (D1)  XBL .
Since R () satises R0  Xs   1 for all Xs and R0  Xs  < 1 for Xs su¢ ciently large,
it is clear that G (D1) is eventually strictly increasing in XGL . Thus for any cv, there
exists XGL large enough such that v   cv > 0.
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Lemma 3 If D1(G) 6= D1(B), then F  (B) = 0.
Proof: If D1(G) 6= D1(B), then pre

IN (D

1(B)) = 0. Assumption (2) implies that bad
funds will not exert e¤ort. Therefore, investors would never knowingly retain a bad fund.
By ring a bad fund and liquidating the rm at fair prices the investor receives XBL ,
whereas retaining him results in a payo¤ of  w + (1  )XBL . Thus, arIN (D1(B)) = 0,
and F  (B) = 0 since choosing F > 0 creates an innitesimal cost for the fund.
Lemma 4 If D1(G) 6= D1(B), then FI (F ) = 1 for F 2
 
0; P IG

.
Proof: The equilibrium payout D1(G) can be represented as a map f :
 
xG1 ; x
B
1
! R+.
The required borrowing is therefore F  (G) = f
 
xG1 ; x
B
1
   xG1 . Except in the special
case in which f
 
xG1 ; x
B
1
   xG1 = k for some k 2 R which by denition can only arise
in equilibria in which nanciers commit/coordinate to lend only specic amounts and
are thus ruled out in our analysis nanciers cannot compute F  (G) before the funding
request is made because they do not know xG1 . However, since F
(B) = 0 (Lemma 3),
any requested amount F 2  0; P IG is consistent with FI (F ) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 4 we know that in an equilibrium withD1(G) 6=
D1(B); 

FI (F ) = 1 for F 2
 
0; P IG

. Thus nanciers are happy to invest up to PIG.
Suppose thatD1(G) < x
B
1 +PI
G. Then, type B can deviate and raiseD1(G) xB1 < PIG
and successfully imitate type G violating D1(G) 6= D1(B).
Proof of Proposition 3: Since there are four possible cash ows generated by the good
type (two aggregate states crossed with project success or failure) the repayment function
R () takes four possible values: R   XGL  , R   XGH, R  XGL, and R  XGH respectively.
The veriability of project success coupled with the non-veriability of realized cash
ows implies that
R
 
XGL

= R
 
XGH

:= R and R
 
XGL

= R
 
XGH

:= R:
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It also implies that in state H the hedge fund captures the incremental cash ows
XGH  XGL and XGH XGL conditional on success and failure respectively, since hedge fund
investors cannot verify whether s = H or L.
E¤ort exertion in state s = L requires that

 
e
 
XGL   R

+ (1  e)  XGL  R  ce    XGL  R ;
i.e., e
  
XGL  XGL
    R R  ce: (8)
E¤ort exertion in state s = H requires that0@ e   XGL   R+ e   XGH   XGL +
 (1  e)  XGL  R+ (1  e)  XGH  XGL
1A  ce    XGL  R+  XGH  XGL ;
i.e., e
  
XGL  XGL
    R R+ e    XGH   XGL    XGH  XGL  ce;
i.e., e
  
XGL  XGL
    R R+ e    XGH  XGH    XGL  XGL  ce: (9)
For arbitrarily chosen parameters, (8) and (9) are clearly most slack if R   R is mini-
mized. With monotonicity R  R. This implies that the two possible optimal nancing
arrangements are: If the hedge fund raises less than XGL , we have safe debt with repay-
ment R = R < XGL . Otherwise, optimal external nancing is achieved via defaultable
debt with R > R = XGL , i.e., the face value of debt must be K  XGL :The maximum
(fulllable) face value of debt is given by K  XGL .
Proof of Proposition 4: The derivation proceeds in four steps.
Step 1: Debt Overhang in s = L
For a given face value of debt K debt overhang arises in state s = L only if


e
 
XGL  K
  e  XGL  min(K;XGL) < ce:
For K < XGL the above reduces to e
 
XGL  XGL
  ce, which violates assumption (2).
Thus, K > XGL , and the maximum face value of debt associated with e¤ort exertion in
state s = L is
K = XGL  
ce
e
:
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Step 2: No Debt Overhang in s = H
For a given face value K, there is no debt overhang in state s = H if
0@  e   XGL  K+ (1  e)  XGL  min(XGL ; K)
+e
  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL
1A  ce    XGL  min(XGL ; K)
Since we look for debt levels that induce debt overhang in state s = L; K > K > XGL
so that the expression above simplies to:
e
 
XGL  K

+ e
  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL  ce  0;
which gives us
K  XGL  
ce
e
+
1

  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL :
If
ce  e
  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL
then the relevant constraint for K is
K  XGL ;
because of the non-veriability of macro states. Assumption (2) guarantees that
ce  e
 
XGL  XGL

:
Thus, if
e
 
XGL  XGL

< e
  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL ,
i.e.,
 
XGH  XGH
  (1 + )   XGL  XGL ;
then, under Assumption (2) the relevant constraint for K is always
K  XGL :
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and
K = XGL :
Step 3: Pledgeable Income PIG
To derive the conditions under which pledgable income is higher, we compare the
maximum pledgable income with debt K and the one with debt K. Without debt
overhang in state s = L pledgeable income is equal to
eK + (1  e)XGL :
Inserting K = XGL   ce=e yields the maximum pledgeable income PIGK :
PIGK = e

XGL  
ce
e

+ (1  e)XGL :
With debt overhang in state s = L pledgable income is equal to
se K + (1  se)XGL :
Inserting the expression for K = XGL yields the maximum pledgeable income PI
G
K
:
PIGK = se
XGL + (1  se)XGL :
Then PIGK > PI
G
K is equivalent to
ce  (1  s)e
 
XGL  XGL

:
Thus, for ce 2
 
0; (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

the maximum pledgeable income is PIGK (Case
A.1), while for ce 2

(1  s)e

XGL  XGL

; e

XGL  XGL

, the maximum pledgeable
income is PIGK (Case A.2).
Case A.1: ce 2
 
0; (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

Step 4 for A.1: Funding amount for PIGK < PI
G
K
Proposition 2 implies that separation requires borrowing of
PIGK  x1 = e

XGL  
ce
e

+ (1  e)XGL  x1,
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and the corresponding face value K solves
e

XGL  
ce
e

+ (1  e)XGL  x1 = eK + (1  e)min(K; XGL): (10)
Suppose K > XGL , then min(K
; XGL) = X
G
L , in which case (10) gives:
K = XGL  
ce
e
  x1
e
;
which is clearly smaller than K = XGL   cee so that there is indeed no debt overhang
in state s = L. Furthermore, the condition XGL > X
G
L +
x1
s(1 s)e in Proposition 4
ensures that K > XGL . Indeed, a su¢ cient condition for K
 > XGL for all ce 2 
0; (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

is that
XGL  
ce
e
  x1
e
> XGL
for ce = (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

. This in turn, is equivalent to:
XGL  XGL >
x1
se
(11)
which always holds since XGL  XGL > x1s(1 s)e >
x1
se
.
It remains to check that it is in the investors interest to retain a good hedge fund.
Retaining the good fund generates a continuation payo¤ equal to
(1  ) e   XGL  K  w;
which does not depend on the aggregate state due to a combination of (i) no debt
overhang and (ii) non veriability of the macro state. Liquidating the fund/rm results
in a payo¤ of max
 
XGL  K; 0

= 0. Thus retention requires:
(1  )
ce

+x1

  w  0 (12)
which is clearly always satised given x1 > w1  . This concludes the proof of the
proposition for constellation A.1.
Case A.2: ce 2

(1  s)e

XGL  XGL

; e

XGL  XGL

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Step 4 for A.2: Funding amount given that PIGK > PI
G
K
Separation requires borrowing of
PIGK  x1 = se XGL + (1  se)XGL  x1,
and the corresponding face value K is obtained by setting
se X
G
L + (1  se)XGL  x1 = seK + (1  se)XGL ;
giving
K =
se X
G
L  x1
se
= XGL  
x1
se
:
For consistency we need K > K, i.e.,
XGL  
x1
se
> XGL  
ce
e
,
i.e.,
x1 <
s

ce
Since ce  (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

, the constraint above is always satised given
XGL  XGL >
x1
s(1  s)e
: (13)
It remains to check that it is in the investors interest to retain a good hedge fund.
Liquidating the fund/rm results in a payo¤ equal of
(1  )  s  e   XGL  K+ (1  e)max  XGL  K; 0+ (1  s)max  XGL  K; 0 w;
Liquidating the fund/rm results in a payo¤ of
max
 
XGL  K; 0

:
Since K = XGL   x1se > K > X
G
L , the investor retains the good fund if:
(1  ) se

XGL   XGL +
x1
se

  w  0 (14)
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which is clearly satised given x1 > w(1 ) . This concludes the proof of the propo-
sition for case A.2.
The consequences of borrowing to separate for Case B
When
 
XGL  XGL

<
 
XGH  XGH

< (1 + )
 
XGL  XGL

, there are two possibilities: For
ce  e
  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL, K = XGL , while for ce > e    XGH  XGH    XGL  XGL,
K = XGL   cee + 1
  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL.
For ce  e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

, K = XGL while K = X
G
L   cee as before.
Consequently,
PIGK = e

XGL  
ce
e

+ (1  e)XGL
and
PIGK = se
XGL + (1  se)XGL
As in case A1), the condition for PIGK  PIGK is
ce  (1  s)e[ XGL  XGL ]
Since ce  e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

, this condition can only be satised if
(1  s)e[ XGL  XGL ]  e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

s  1 
1

 XGH  XGH
XGL  XGL
  1

:= ~s:
Note that ~s ! 0 as
XGH XGH
XGL XGL
! 1+ and ~s ! 1 as
XGH XGH
XGL XGL
! 1 so s 2 [0; 1]. Thus, for
s < ~s the maximum pledgeable income is PI
G
K for all ce 2
 
0; e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

.
For s  ~s, the maximum pledgeable income is PIGK for ce 2
 
0; (1  s)e[ XGL  XGL ]

and PIGK for ce 2
 
(1  s)e[ XGL  XGL ]; e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

. To ensure
debt overhang in the latter case, the face value associated with raising F = PIGK  x1
has to be larger than K. As shown in case A.2 (step 4) above, this holds for x1 <
s

ce
which is again guaranteed by (13).
For ce 2
 
e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

; e

XGL  XGL

, K = XGL   cee as before
and K = XGL   cee + 1
  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL. Consequently,
PIGK = e

XGL  
ce
e

+ (1  e)XGL
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and
PIGK = se

XGL  
ce
e
+
1

  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL+ (1  se)XGL
Hence, PIGK  PIGK holds if
se
24 XGL   cee + 1
0@ ( XGH  XGH)
 ( XGL  XGL)
1A35+ (1  se)XGL  e XGL   cee+ (1  e)XGL
i.e.,
s 
XGL  XGL   cee
1

  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL+   XGL  XGL   cee := ^s 2 (0; 1) :
Thus, in the range ce 2
 
e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

; e( XGL  XGL)

the maximum
pledgeable income is PIGK for s < ^s and PI
G
K
for s  ^s. To ensure debt overhang in
the latter case, the face value associated with raising F = PIGK  x1 has to be larger
than K. As shown in case A.2 (step 4) above, this holds for x1 <
s

ce which is again
guaranteed by (13).
We now establish that ~s  ^s. Suppose the reverse were true, i.e., ~s < ^s and
consider s 2 (~s; ^s) and e¤ort costs immediately to the left and right of the threshold
e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

. Since s > ~s, for ce = e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)
  
for some small  > 0, PIGK > PI
G
K . Yet, since s < ^s, for ce = e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

+
, PIGK < PI
G
K . Note that PI
G
K is given by e
 
XGL   cee

+ (1  e)XGL for all ce and de-
creases in ce at the rate 1=.
In contrast, for ce 2

e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)
  ; e ( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL),
PIGK is given by se
XGL + (1  se)XGL which is invariant with ce. For
ce 2
 
e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

; e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

+ 

, PIGK is given
by se

XGL   cee + 1
  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL + (1  se)XGL which decreases in
ce at the rate s=, i.e., more slowly than PI
G
K in the same interval. Thus if PI
G
K
> PIGK
for ce = e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)
    it must also be true that PIGK > PIGK for
ce = e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

+ , a contradiction.
To summarize our ndings, we have three regions in terms of s:
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1. If s < ^s, then PI
G
K
< PIGK for the full relevant range of ce and there is no debt
overhang.
2. If ^s  s < ~s, then for ce 2
 
0; e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

we have PIGK <
PIGK and no debt overhang, while for ce 2
 
e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

; e( XGL  XGL)

we have PIGK > PI
G
K and debt overhang.
3. If ~s  s, then for ce 2
 
0; (1  s)e[ XGL  XGL ]

we have PIGK < PI
G
K and
no debt overhang, while for ce 2
 
(1  s)e[ XGL  XGL ]; e( XGL  XGL)

we have
PIGK > PI
G
K and debt overhang.
It remains to check that it is in the investors interest to retain a good fund. In all
three regions of s where PI
G
K > PI
G
K
the analysis of the retention decision is identical
to case A.1 (step 4). In the regions s < ^s and s  ~s where PIGK > PIGK the
constraint K = XGL binds, and the analysis of the retention decision is identical to
case A.2. (step 4). In the region s 2 [^s; ~s) where PIGK > PIGK the constraint
K = XGL   cee + 1
  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL binds. The corresponding face value of
debt K is obtained by setting
se

XGL   cee + 1
  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL
+(1  se)XGL  x1
= seK
 + (1  se)XGL ;
giving
K = XGL  
ce
e
+
1

  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL  x1se :
Hence, the investors payo¤ from retaining the fund is
(1  )

XGL  

XGL  
ce
e
+
1

  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL  x1se

  w
and retention is in the investors interest if
ce
e
  1

  
XGH  XGH
    XGL  XGL+ x1se

 w
(1  )
Since ce > e

( XGH  XGH)  ( XGL  XGL)

, this condition is satised given x1 > w(1 ) .
This concludes the analysis of the consequences of borrowing to separate for case B.
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Investor participation constraint for ce 2
 
0; (1  s)e

XGL  XGL

:
Since (as shown in the proof of Proposition 4) K > XGL , if the investors invest 1 + w
in the hedge fund (w is used for fees and 1 is invested in the block) then they receive
the following expected payo¤s:

h
E
 
xG1

+ e

XGL  
ce
e

+ (1  e)XGL  x1   w + (1  )
ce

+x1
i
+(1  )XBL :
Hence, participation requires


E
 
xG1

+ e
 
XGL   cee

+ (1  e)XGL  x1   w + (1  )
 
ce

+x1

+(1  )XBL > 1 + w
which is clearly satised as long as XGL is high enough.
Proof of Proposition 5: To separate, the good fund must pay out enough to prevent
mimicking by the bad fund. The good fund always prefers to pay out liquid assets Y0 in
the rst period (that would anyway go to creditors in the second period) because, holding
xed the separation payout, replacing the paying out of Y0 with additional borrowing
is costly: For each dollar borrowed the good fund must pay back either 1=se (if debt
overhang arises) or 1=e (otherwise) in the second period. Both are costly to the hedge
funds payo¤, as it receives a second period carry. This establishes that Y0 is fully paid
out in any separating equilibrium. The remaining steps mirror those of the proof of
Proposition 4, and are thus stated in brief.
Given pre-existing debt K0 and all liquid assets Y0 paid out, there is debt overhang
in s = L if the face value of debt satises K > KK0  XGL   K0   cee , and no debt
overhang in s = H if K < XGL  K0   cee + 1
 
XGH   XGL

. As before, non-veriability
imposes an upper bound K  KK0  XGL   K0. As in the leading Case A of the
baseline analysis, as long as XGH  (1 + ) XGL , it is this latter constraint which binds.
We restrict attention to this case. For ce 2

(1  s)e

XGL  K0

; e XGL

, it is easy
to check that PIGKK0
> PIGKK0
. Thus, separation requires an amount of borrowing
equal to PIGKK0
  x1 = se
 
XGL  K0
   x1, with corresponding face value KK0 =
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XGL  K0   x1se . For consistency we need K

K0
> KK0, which is always satised as long
as XGL  K0 > x1s(1 s)e , which is a very similar condition to the baseline model.
Next we check that the investor wants to retain a good hedge fund. Since w paid at
t = 1 is sunk and the investor has already received D1 = x
G
1 + Y0 + se
 
XGL  K0
  
x1; the investor retains the good fund if (1  ) se
 
XGL  K0  KK0
  w, i.e., if
(1  )x1 > w as in the baseline model. Note that for ce 2

(1  s)e XGL ; e XGL

, if
K0 = 0, and Y0 is paid out in the rst period, the analysis of the baseline model implies
that debt overhang arises in the low state in the SEML. Since
(1  s)e XGL ; e XGL
  (1  s)e  XGL  K0 ; e XGL  ;
we can conclude that for ce 2

(1  s)e XGL ; e XGL

, for XGL and x1 large enough
debt overhang arises in the low state in the SEML in levered and unlevered target rms.
Finally, we can compare (i) the payo¤s to equity holders in rms with and without
pre-existing debt in the presence of hedge fund activists and (ii) the payo¤s to pre-
existing creditors in levered target rms in the presence and absence of hedge fund
activists.
(i) Payo¤s to equity holders: With pre-existing leverage of K0, target shareholders
receive an expected payo¤ of

 
E
 
xG1

+ Y0 + se
 
XGL  K0
 x1+ (1  )E  xB1 
in the rst period and x1 in the second period. Without leverage, target shareholders
receive an expected payo¤ of

 
E
 
xG1

+ Y0 + se X
G
L  x1

+ (1  )E
 
xB1

in the rst period and x1 in the second period. Thus, leverage reduces rst period
payo¤s to target shareholders without a¤ecting second period payo¤s.
(ii) Payo¤s to pre-existing creditors: In the absence of the hedge fund activists,
creditors would have expected to receive K0 in the second period in either state (since
Y0 > K0). In the presence of hedge fund activists, the same creditors can expect to
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receiveK0 in the second period in the high state with probability e but nothing otherwise.
Thus, the presence of activist hedge funds expropriates pre-existing creditors.
Proof of Proposition 6: To separate, the good type has to pay out D1(G) = x
B
1 +
Y0 and can therefore retain at most x1 liquid assets. Given K0 > x1, the incentive
compatibility constraint in state s = L
e( XGL   (K0  x1)) > ce
is violated for ce 2
 
e

XGL   (K0  x1)

; e XGL

. By contrast, it is easy to see that
the incentive compatibility constraint in state s = H
e
 
XGL   (K0  x1)

+ e
 
XGH   XGL
  ce
is slack provided that XGH > (1 + ) X
G
L .
Proof of Proposition 8: We begin by assuming that
 
XBH   XBL

1 
k


>  XGL ; (15)
which implies that
 
XBH   XBL

1 
k


>
ce
e
for all ce  e XGL .
As will become clear later, this formalizes the sense in which we need XBH to be big
enough and e¤ectively restricts us to the equivalent of case A in the baseline model.
First we compute the debt capacity of the bad type, PIB. Since leverage is observ-
able, mimicking requires that k = x1. Given ce > e XBL , the bad type does not make
an e¤ort in state s = L and his debt capacity is determined by his potential output in
state s = H. The face value KB that makes the bad type indi¤erent between exerting
e¤ort in state s = H is determined by
e

XBL

1  x1


 KB

+ e
 
XBH   XBL

1  x1


  ce = 0;
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i.e.,
KB = XBL

1  x1


+
1

 
XBH   XBL

1  x1


  ce
e
:
However, the non-veriability of macro states implies that
KB  XBL

1  x1


.
As long as  
XBH   XBL

1  x1


>
ce
e
,
which is guaranteed by (15), the latter constraint is binding and the bad funds debt
capacity is
PIB (k = x1) = se X
B
L

1  x1


:
Consequently, the good type has to borrow se X
B
L
 
1  x1


+  in the rst period to
separate, and there are two possibilities:
Case 1: Borrowing se XBL
 
1  x1


induces debt overhang in state s = L.
Case 2: Borrowing se XBL
 
1  x1


does not induce debt overhang in state s = L.
Case 1
With debt overhang in state s = L, the face value KG associated with borrowing
se X
B
L
 
1  x1


solves:
se X
B
L

1  x1


= se K
G + s (1  e) 0 + (1  s) 0.
Consistency requires that KG = XBL
 
1  x1


leads to debt overhang in state s = L
but not in state s = H. The former implies
e

XGL   XBL

1  x1


< ce.
Since e
 
XGL   XBL
 
1  x1


< e XGL for any X
G
L , the constraints on X
G
L below do not
a¤ect the existence of a positive measure of e¤ort costs
 
e
 
XGL   XBL
 
1  x1


; e XGL

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for which borrowing se X
B
L
 
1  x1


induces debt overhang in state s = L. E¤ort ex-
ertion in s = H requires that
e

XGL   XBL

1  x1


+ e
 
XGH   XGL
  ce;
i.e.,
XGH  (1  ) XGL +  XBL

1  x1


+
ce
e
;
which can be guaranteed by the following condition:
XGH  (1  ) XGL +  XBL

1  x1


+  XGL =
XGL + 
XBL

1  x1


: (16)
A good fund separates only if investors retain a fund that separates. Since the payo¤
from closing the fund down is 0 (since Xs = 0 for all ; s), investors retain the fund if
 w + (1  ) se

XGL   XBL

1  x1


 0;
i.e.,
XGL  XBL

1  x1


+
w
se (1  )
: (17)
Finally, it must be veried that the good fund prefers to use leverage to monetization.26
For any monetization, leverage combination (kG; LG) by the good type the bad type
will aim to imitate by choosing (kB = kG +x1; LB = LG). Thus, unless type G sets
kG > k x1, his only option is to separate using leverage, and thus have a monetization-
leverage combination of
 
kG; LG = PI
B (kG +x1) + 

. Above we have solved for the
case where kG = 0, and now examine whether a good fund can realize a higher payo¤
by choosing kG 2
 
0; k  x1

combined with the corresponding separating leverage.
Increasing kG gives raise to two conicting e¤ects: On the one hand a larger kG destroys
cash ows, thereby reducing the good funds payo¤. On the other hand, a larger kG
raises kB = kG +x1 which reduces the pledgable income of the bad fund and thus the
leverage required for separation which in turn increases the good funds payo¤.
26Since leverage is publicly observable, another way to rule out monetization is to choose o¤ equilib-
rium beliefs suitably. However, the argument here shows that we do not need to resort to o¤ equilibrium
beliefs to rule out monetization by the good fund.
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We start with
 
kG = 0; LG = PI
B(k = x1

and increase kG slightly to k > 0, as-
suming that there is still enough leverage to generate debt overhang in state s = L.
Arguments that parallel the computation of PIB (k = x1) above imply that, as long
as  
XBH   XBL

1  k +x1


>
ce
e
,
which is guaranteed by (15), KB  XBL
 
1  k+x1


binds and
PIB (k +x1) = se X
B
L

1  k +x1


:
Given this amount of borrowing leads to debt overhang in state s = L, the corresponding
face value KG is
KG = XBL

1  k +x1


.
Under this deviation, the expected payo¤ to the good fund is:
se

XGL

1  k


  XBL

1  k +x1


+ se
 
XGH   XGL

1  k


  sce:
In contrast, in equilibrium, the expected payo¤ to the good fund is:
se

XGL   XBL

1  x1


+ se
 
XGH   XGL
  sce:
Thus, the deviation is unprotable as long as:
se
k



 
XGL   XBL

+
 
XGH   XGL

> 0;
which is always true.
Now, consider a larger increase k^ such that, due to the reduction in PIB, the implied
face value of debt does not lead to debt overhang in state s = L for the good fund, while
the bad fund still does not exert e¤ort in state s = L. As before, given condition (15),
the pledgeable income of the bad fund is given by
PIB

k^ +x1

= se X
B
L
 
1  k^ +x1

!
,
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while the corresponding face value of debt solves
se X
B
L
 
1  k^ +x1

!
= seK
G + (1  s) eKG;
i.e.,
KG = s X
B
L
 
1  k^ +x1

!
Under this deviation, the expected payo¤ to the good fund is:
e
 
XGL
 
1  k^

!
  s XBL
 
1  k^ +x1

!!
+ se
 
XGH   XGL
 
1  k^

!
  ce:
In contrast, in equilibrium, the expected payo¤ to the good fund is:
se

XGL   XBL

1  x1


+ se
 
XGH   XGL
  sce:
Thus, the deviation is unprotable as long as:
e
 
XGL
 
s  
 
1  k^

!!
  s XBL
k^

!
+ se
 
XGH   XGL
 k^

+ (1  s) ce > 0; (18)
which holds as long as XGH is large enough.
Since the bad fund never exerts e¤ort in state s = L the set of cases considered so
far is exhaustive. Thus, when ce 2
 
e
 
XGL   XBL
 
1  x1


; e XGL

and (15), (16),
(17), and (18) hold, the SEML involves debt overhang in state s = L.
Case 2
Without debt overhang in state s = L;the face value KG associated with borrowing
se X
B
L
 
1  x1


solves:
se X
B
L

1  x1


= seK
G + s (1  e) 0 + (1  s) eKG + (1  s) (1  e) 0,
i.e.
KG = s X
B
L

1  x1


.
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Consistency requires that the good type exerts e¤ort in both states when borrowing with
a promised repayment amount of KG = s X
B
L
 
1  x1


. E¤ort exertion in state s = L
requires that
e

XGL   s XBL

1  x1


 ce.
The non-emptyness of this e¤ort cost region is guaranteed by:
e

XGL   s XBL

1  x1


> e XBL ;
XGL >
XBL

1 + s

1  x1


:
which is implied by condition (17) because
XBL

1  x1


+
w
se (1  )
> XBL

1  x1


+ XBL > X
B
L

1 + s

1  x1


.
where the rst inequality follows from assumption (7). The exertion of e¤ort in state
s = H is guaranteed by
e

XGL   s XBL

1  x1


+ e
 
XGH   XGL
  ce;
which is implied by (16).
Retention by investors conditional on separation requires that
 w + (1  ) e

XGL   s XBL

1  x1


 0;
which is implied by (17).
As before we conclude with checking that the good fund prefers to use leverage to
monetization. The good type never nds it desirable to monetize enough to induce debt
overhang in state s = L. This would increase the face value of debt, reducing the carry
and in addition the good fund would receive the carry only in state s = H. Thus,
the only possibility that we need to consider is an increase to k^ which does not lead to
debt overhang in state s = L. As before, given condition (15), the pledgeable income of
the bad type in this case is given by
PIB

k^ +x1

= se X
B
L
 
1  k^ +x1

!
:
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while the corresponding face value of debt solves
se X
B
L
 
1  k^ +x1

!
= seK
G + (1  s) eKG,
so that
KG = s X
B
L
 
1  k^ +x1

!
Under this deviation, the expected payo¤ to the good fund is:
e
 
XGL
 
1  k^

!
  s XBL
 
1  k^ +x1

!!
+ se
 
XGH   XGL
 
1  k^

!
  ce:
In contrast, in equilibrium, the expected payo¤ to the good fund is:
e

XGL   s XBL

1  x1


+ se
 
XGH   XGL
  ce:
Thus, the deviation is unprotable as long as:
e
k^

 
XGL   XBL

+ se
 
XGH   XGL
 k^

> 0; (19)
which is always true.
Thus, when ce 2
 
e XBL ; e
 
XGL   s XBL
 
1  x1


and (15), (16) and (17) hold,
the SEML involves no debt overhang in s = L.
Combining the analysis for Cases 1 and 2, we note that for
ce 2

e

XGL   XBL

1  x1


; e

XGL   s XBL

1  x1


the SEML may or may not involve debt overhang in s = L. In order to consider only
essential instances of debt overhang we thus unify the two cases as follows: When (15),
(16), (17), and (18) hold, there exist SEML without debt overhang in s = L for ce 2 
e XBL ; e
 
XGL   s XBL
 
1  x1


while for ce 2
 
e
 
XGL   s XBL
 
1  x1


; e XGL

,
the SEML involves debt overhang in s = L.
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